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When asked to write a comment on Sidney Tarrow's recent book, I accepted with 
pleasure, both because of my regard for the author, and because looking at the book 
has given me the opportunity to renew – after almost 50 years – an accidentally inter-
rupted  friendship. I also appreciate this book because it has given me the chance to 
talk about and discuss with him themes that have always interested me greatly. How-
ever, when I accepted the proposal, I had not fully realised the problems that a 
straightforward historian like me, used to working only in my own backyard, might en-
counter in dealing with the general questions posed by a work of historical political sci-
ence. While I am the first, therefore, to recognise my limits and my possible misunder-
standings, I shall try to proceed by comparing certain of the themes presented in the 
fascinating picture painted by Tarrow with my own, more specific, research, which 
deals with the social and institutional history of the First World War, and the links of 
this period with the advent of Fascism and the Second World War.  In particular, in re-
cent years, I have been looking at the role of state intervention during the war years 
and at the dualism that develops between the politics of emergency and the politics of 
assistance (warfare and welfare) in the various belligerent nations. This has led me to 
concentrate on both the attack on civil rights and on the concession of certain social 
benefits, made in response to the needs of collective assistance and to the acquired 
rights of certain specific categories (the wounded, the permanently disabled, the or-
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phans – but also the women employed in the war industries). These are themes, I 
think, relevant to some of the issues raised by Tarrow and I will try to illustrate them 
more fully.  
The central concern of Tarrow can be located in the relationship, at certain historical 
moments, that civil rights have with popular movements (contentious politics), with 
war (war making), and with the hierarchical and/or infrastructural power of the state 
(state building). In respect of this last element, it seems to me – certainly simplifying – 
that Tarrow understands by hierarchical power both the despotic power of pre-liberal 
governments (for example, Italy in the first decades after Unification) and that – con-
stricting rights – employed by all governments in specific historical moments, above all 
if/when justified by a state of necessity. Infrastructural power, on the other hand, can 
be identified, in general, in the various forms of control which link states to civil socie-
ty, encouraging organisms that either cultivate consensus or carry out some kind of 
surveillance. As far as movements are concerned, it is clear that, while Tarrow gives 
greater emphasis to opposition movements, he also quite rightly includes in his analy-
sis those engendered by an exasperated patriotism and by the opposition itself – 
movements which support the more extreme positions of governments with the inten-
tion of compelling them to adopt a greater use of hierarchical power. 
The political dynamics of states are thus seen by Tarrow as determined by the rela-
tionship that develops between these elements – hierarchical and/or infrastructural 
power, rights and movements – both in wartime and in the periods following war. In 
this context it must be remembered that, after the First World War, there begins a long 
post-war which lasts until the outbreak of the Second World War (a 'thirty years war', 
as many have described it) and that, following the Second World War, there begins a 
'war without end' with a particular impact on the organisation and control of public 
opinion, as Tarrow shows so well for the USA. The relationship between power and 
rights has to be analysed beyond the limited period of the war itself, therefore, and is 
conditioned by factors that Tarrow identifies as being of a political nature; factors that 
we recognise as constituting a 'state of exception' – an openly expressed or tacit for-
mula that permits a state, not formally involved in military operations, to pass excep-
tional legislation on the basis of the principle of legitimacy, which takes the place of 
that of legality ('what is right is what is necessary') and to exclude from the enjoyment 
of civil rights certain specific categories of person, identified as 'internal enemies' (sus-
pect foreigners, immigrants, opposition figures). 
Following this rather simplified argument, I want to look at a few of the five ques-
tions that Tarrow asks about power, contention and war – that is, about the ways in 
which rights are modified in time of war, on how protest is controlled (contentious pol-
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itics), and on how all this impacts on the politics of the post-war. These are themes that 
Tarrow analyses well in his chapter on Italy from Unification to fascism. I want to look 
in particular at the period of the First World War, analysing first the relationship be-
tween power (hierarchical-despotic and/or infrastructural power) and rights (civil 
and/or social), passing subsequently to an analysis of the problem of protest.  
As Tarrow recognises, in Italy, despite the efforts made by Giolitti to move in a dem-
ocratic direction, the state remained prevalently authoritarian in character, with a low 
level of social integration and without an adequate infrastructural organisation (as not-
ed by contemporaries: See Cabrini 1914). The war served to accentuate this authoritar-
ian character and favoured the formation of a regime that corresponded fully to the 
prototype of the Schmittian state. If in all belligerent countries the war changed the re-
lationship between internal powers and led everywhere to a drastic limitation of indi-
vidual liberties, in Italy, thanks to the return to government of the old Destra storica 
(personified in the couple Salandra-Sonnino) and thanks also to the very broad powers 
given to the military in the civilian realm, a classic despotic regime (according to the 
classification provided by Scheppele, listed by Tarrow on pp. 22-3) was formed, with a 
basis closer to the model of the autocratic enemies (Germany and Austria-Hungary) 
than that of the allies. In Italy the power of the legislature was virtually annulled in fa-
vour of the executive, and the judiciary was also subordinated to the executive. But Ita-
ly resembled the continental autocratic powers above all because of the extensive 
powers entrusted to the military, whereas in Britain and France such concessions were 
limited and constantly controlled by civil power. In Italy the military forces were given 
the jurisdiction of very large zones of the country – in the last year of the war they con-
trolled almost all of northern and central Italy – and they were also given the total con-
trol of industrial production, in such a way as to produce a very close intertwining be-
tween politics and military industries. In addition and unlike the allies, the military had 
control over the labour force, which was militarised and subject, therefore, to the mili-
tary penal code, as in Austria and (in part) in Germany. Finally, it has to be noted that 
the legislation passed at the moment of entry into the war was extremely severe: not 
only were public demonstrations of dissent punished with severe penalties but even 
opinions 'likely to produce disturbances' were punishable. Censorship was extensive, 
including private correspondence, and assigned to military offices, and vast powers 
were given to the prefects, including, in the last year of the conflict, the right to send 
citizens not guilty of any crime but considered 'suspect' to internal exile in remote vil-
lages and islands. This power, widely used by the military authorities in the early years 
of the conflict to expel from the war zones those who were citizens of enemy states 
and Italians suspected of sympathy with Austria (the so-called 'austriacanti'), permitted 
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military commanders to deport hundreds of opponents, socialists and anarchists, and 
to 'liberate' the cities from 'undesirable' elements, such as homosexuals and prosti-
tutes. (On the characteristics and the effects of militarisation in the various belligerent 
nations, see Procacci 2009).  
Many contemporary writers remarked on the trauma suffered by democracy during 
the First World War and on the deep and far from transitory changes produced by the 
conflict. While some observers concentrated their attention on the abnormal presence 
of the state in all sectors, including that of thought ('étatisation de la pensée' ' organi-
sation de l'enthousiasme' according to Halévy in L'ère des tyrannies), others looked the 
abnormal expansion of the executive and the marginalisation of legislative power, or 
else analysed the logic of power and of the state of exception; others commented on 
the characteristics of the planning state, of the bureaucracy, and of organised capital-
ism, concentrating their analysis on the expansion of military power and on the conse-
quent limitation of civil liberties. Thus, for example, as early as 1918 J.A.Hobson was 
able to write.  
The antagonism between war and the exercise of those personal and political liber-
ties comprised in democracy is indisputable [….] A brief recital of the various invasions 
upon ordinary liberties will suffice. This legislation, supplemented by arbitrary police 
administration and mob violence has made heavy inroads upon our ordinary liberties 
of speech, meeting and Press, of travel, trade, occupation and investment. The State 
restricts and regulates our use of food and drink, lets down our services of public 
health and education, remits the wholesome safeguards of our Factory Acts, and re-
moves the constitutional guarantees of civil liberty. Military and civil authorities may, 
and do, arrest, deport and imprison men and women without formulating charges or 
bringing them to trial. The security of Habeas Corpus and of trial by jury in an open 
court, in accordance with the rules of law, has been abrogated for whole classes of al-
leged offenders, and in many instances the onus of proving innocence has been thrown 
on the arrested person. Domiciliary visits of the police, the opening of private corre-
spondence, and the use of agents provocateurs have passed from Russia into Britain. 
(Hobson 1918, pp. 13-14) 
Returning to the question of the violation of rights, one can ask how public opinion 
reacted. The reply is very probably that such opinion was conditioned mainly by propa-
ganda. As many studies have shown, the propaganda of the allies in respect of the cen-
tral powers – presented in terms of a crusade of civilisation against the Teutonic bar-
barians – produced a strong emotional reaction and a polarisation between 'good' and 
'ill' right from the start, one that was easily transposed to the home front as a struggle 
against 'internal enemies', intent on undermining national resistance. And while, in 
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other belligerent countries, these 'internal enemies' were identified above all among 
foreigners and spies, in Italy, where the bitter conflict between supporters of the war 
and pacifist socialists had characterised the months prior to Italy’s entry into the war, it 
was easy subsequently to identify enemies among the 'defeatists’, whose propaganda 
– it was said – had made the Caporetto route possible. More than in other countries 
(though even in other countries a climate of political and ideological contrast devel-
oped in the last year of the war) – in Italy after Caporetto there developed that classic 
dualism, so brilliantly described by Schmitt, between 'us' and 'them'. If extremist 
groups sprang up everywhere in the later stages of the conflict, calling for the continu-
ation of the war and using violence to attack supposed enemies (like the 'Patriots' who 
supported the strong government of Lloyd George), Italy had already had this experi-
ence in 1915, when socialist demonstrators were attacked by interventionist groups 
with the support of the government: the path for post-war fascist organisations had 
opened up in this way. It was then necessary that the dictatorial regimes integrate 
these private armies – Fasci and SA – into the structure of the state, thus making them 
a part of the infrastructural power of the regime. 
As Tarrow notes, the war, given the enormous multiplication of public responsibili-
ties, produced not only the reinforcement of hierarchical power but also an expansion 
of infrastructural power. The exceptional functions that the state had to carry out in 
wartime within the civilian realm concerned essentially two areas: on one hand social 
control, on the other welfare and propaganda. As far as the first is concerned, it was 
effected by legislation limiting rights and through spying activities aimed at both ene-
my infiltrators and at possible 'saboteurs': the listing of suspects was perfected (in 
France this was done through the Carnet B, in Italy through the Casellario Politico Cen-
trale, set up in 1894), as was that of foreign residents. Those agencies of counter-
espionage which already existed were reinforced (there was already an efficient service 
in Great Britain which depended on the Secret Intelligence Service of 1909) and others 
were set up ex novo: one such was the Ufficio centrale d'investigazione, created in Italy 
in 1916 and the initial nucleus of what would become the fascist police. Turning to wel-
fare and propaganda, there were a large number of government institutions in all 
countries operating to help the families of those enlisted, orphans, women, the demo-
bilised, and the disabled. Thus, while civil rights were limited, social rights were ex-
tended – to the extent that the beginning of universal welfare has been argued to lie in 
the First World War (Procacci 2013). Even in Italy – dominated by a hierarchical-
despotic power - the infrastructural network was extended: numerous public institutes 
were set up, but with one peculiarity – where social control was involved, most were 
run by the military. Besides the organisation of espionage and censorship, the military 
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was also given the task of enforcing discipline and organising welfare within the facto-
ries – this last through an office responsible for 'vigilance in health and hygiene'. Re-
sponsibility for food supplies and for food distribution, initially also delegated to the 
military authorities, was subsequently entrusted to a state agency (subject to an en-
quiry after the war because of its inefficiency). Propaganda and welfare was assigned 
by the government to the individual communes, which in turn relied on voluntary asso-
ciations of private citizens. Only in 1918, following the defeat at Caporetto, did the 
state take on the task of propaganda, setting up a special agency – the Ufficio P (P for 
propaganda) which operated mainly at the front line. Propaganda on the home front 
and, above all, welfare, were neglected by the state, and those institutes set up to help 
soldiers, the disabled, and orphans struggled to keep going. Overall, therefore, the 
multiplication of infrastructural agencies was late in coming, fragmented and uncoor-
dinated (between the military, the government, the communes, and private citizens) 
and inefficient (Crocella and Mazzonis 2002).  
In the immediate post-war, with the disbanding of many of the principal agencies 
created for the war emergency (such as the Mobilitazione industriale), various projects 
of administrative and infrastructural reform were proposed which were, however, 
halted before completion due to the advent of Fascism. A large number of infrastruc-
tural agencies and institutes were then created by the fascist regime. If the totalitarian 
dictatorships represented the absolute prototype of the hierarchical and despotic 
state, they also perfected the infrastructural mechanisms of social control, both in a 
repressive and preventative sense and in a welfare and consensual direction. The many 
agencies of surveillance and integration in totalitarian states are well known – from the 
OVRA, to the Gestapo, to the KGB and the Stasi. These were accompanied by the youth 
and women's organisations, by the propaganda agencies, and so on (in Italy, the OMNI, 
the Balilla, the Massaie rurali, the Dopolavoro, etc.).  
However, we must return to Tarrow's theme concerning the relationship between 
state power and contentious politics during the war and the post-war. We need to veri-
fy – for Italy – how the structure of power reacts when faced by agitation and, vice ver-
sa, how the agitations effect power itself. 
It is clear that a fundamental cause of the agitations that rock the country right from 
the moment of Unification is the nature of political power – despotic power – and the 
lack of an effective legitimation of that power within the country. It is interesting to 
note how the profoundly anti-state character of the agitations continues through the 
Giolittian period, and is exemplified by the popular response to the Libyan war. The an-
ti-system protest becomes particularly acute in 1914, beginning with the anti-military 
revolt of the 'Red Week' and carrying on in 1915 with popular protest against economic 
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hardship and, finally, with the political clash between interventionists and pacifists. The 
response to agitation is Italy’s entry into the war, decided in part for reasons related to 
international equilibria and by the desire to impose an alternative to the existing gov-
ernment through the passage from a man of the liberal left like Giolitti to exponents of 
the authoritarian right, but also by the desire to impose a brake on social protest by 
force. Agitations were therefore a partial cause of entry into the war (the war was seen 
as a panacea). But the evolution of a particularly strong hierarchical power during the 
conflict does not put an end to agitation; repression cannot stop it because it does not 
originate from organised groups. The actions of the socialist party are in fact prevented 
by legislation, while local socialist organisations help with welfare and, in parliament, 
the parliamentary group fights for the defence of civil rights. The agitations are spon-
taneous and derive from elementary needs, such as the lack of bread, or from necessi-
ties created by the war itself, and they see women, who are difficult to punish collec-
tively, as protagonists. The same happens in the factories, where anti-state sentiment 
is aroused by the physical presence of the military, which impose discipline; here it is 
always the women who begin the protests – usually short, unexpected, and repeated. 
These are then accompanied by those of the more skilled working class men – those 
linked to the socialist party.  
The agitations in Italy are, therefore, continuous, beginning in the first months of the 
war and carrying on until its end, despite the state of exception and heavy repression. 
This prevents isolated dissent but it is unable to contain mass dissent. And if the agita-
tions explode because of the despotic character of the state and provoke the accentua-
tion of the same, they do not lead to changes in the infrastructural order. As we have 
already seen, the state concerns itself with questions of welfare only late on and insuf-
ficiently. It is clear, therefore, that the absence of a welfare network (to distribute food 
and subsidies for example) and the extension of despotic power serve to increase the 
level of agitation: Tarrow's thesis that the agitations are strongest where infrastructur-
al power is weak and where hierarchical power is more rigid is fully confirmed. 
Tarrow accepts the thesis that there is continuity between the agitations of the war 
and those of the post-war - the so-called 'four red years' of 1917-20 (but we could also 
speak of 'seven red years' between 1914 and 1920 if we include not only working class 
struggles but also popular protest). Tarrow correctly constructs his analysis by showing 
the continuities between war and post-war, identifying in the war, in its character and 
in the energies it releases, the origins of the economic, social, and legitimation crisis of 
the post-war (rights overridden, promises not kept). The defeat of the liberal state is 
seen as linked, therefore, with the chronic infrastructural weakness of the Italian state 
and with the recourse made to the traditional form of despotic power, whereas the 
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events in Russia and the maximalist ideology of the socialists are considered to have 
had only indirect importance. Tarrow implicitly differs, therefore, from those who have 
tried to separate the war from the advent of Fascism and have seen the cause of Fas-
cism in the strong popular and workers' movements of the post-war and the revolu-
tionary danger connected to it – a danger to which the reply of the fascist squads is 
considered inevitable (and seen as being almost legitimate in as far as it claimed to de-
fend order and patriotic values, insufficiently defended by the liberal governments) 
(Vivarelli 2012). The profound difference between the popular and fascist movements 
was the fact that the former had a defensive character – it was in defence of order in 
the face of a threatened right-wing coup d'état that the socialists acted in parliament – 
while the latter marked themselves out for actions of attack, with clearly eversive ob-
jectives. 
Now the last question: what links this period and these circumstances with the his-
tory of the USA and contemporary wars? As far as the USA is concerned Tarrow notes 
how, from the First World War on, a hierarchical power established itself which, based 
on a link between political and industrial interests and on the use of infrastructural 
powers to ensure popular support, passed laws that limited civil rights, aimed above all 
at the danger of infiltration by spies; and how, following the First World War, a kind of 
hysteria developed very similar to that in Europe, with the formation of right-wing ex-
tremist groups which violently attacked immigrants and those considered subversives. 
The campaign against the 'internal enemies' in the immediate post-war led to the ar-
rest and deportation of thousands of foreigners, presaging, in World War Two, the ille-
gal internment of the Japanese. Subsequently the onset of the Cold War produced a 
sense of permanent emergency that formed the humus for continuous military prepa-
ration and for clandestine military operations. The analogies are all too obvious. 
Tarrow also clarifies how, with the condition of 'war without end' created by the 
Cold War and, above all, by 9/11, the relationship between war and power has 
changed. The forms of hierarchical power have been strengthened in such a way that 
the National Security State as it existed in the 1950s and 1960s, has been transformed 
into a real state of emergency. Government, thanks to the principal of the Unitary Ex-
ecutive, can use exceptional powers without end, and, through explicit laws (such as 
the Patriot Act) can abolish habeus corpus and proceed to mass arrests, to deporta-
tions, and to internment camps (Guantanamo). Even so – Tarrow observes – the mod-
ern state depends much more on infrastructural than on hierarchical power when it 
comes to beginning a war or continuing one. Thus the real danger for the modern state 
lies not so much in the formation of a Schmittian state, through the extension of pow-
ers of control, as in the manipulation of law while retaining the fiction of respect for 
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the law. The extension of infrastructural powers have permitted the gaining of consen-
sus through the media and through the hidden agencies of control - much more exten-
sive and capillary in their operation than before, even when compared with the situa-
tion in the USSR and its satellites. 
However, Tarrow notes, since these agencies are not under public control, episodes 
like that of Edward Snowden can emerge, provoking protest movements (contentious 
politics) and legal actions aimed at protecting human rights. These are encouraged by 
the civic conscience and the sense of identity existing in the USA where, already after 
the First World War, lawyers and judges had defended the civil liberties of foreigners 
(with the result that Congress repealed the Sedition Act in the 1920s). 
In my opinion a similar civic conscience is unfortunately not present in Italy, where, 
despite a current of public opinion hostile to mafia illegality and favourable to a policy 
of support for certain magistrates, movements for the defence of rights have been con-
fined to a social and cultural elite and have been of limited duration. The persistence 
over twenty years of the Berlusconi subculture, structured on the prevalence of indi-
vidual over collective interests, is the most obvious demonstration of this. In Italy 
forms of civil society protest comparable with the demonstrations of the 'indignados' 
or with phenomena like the various 'Occupy' movements in the USA have simply not 
emerged. The problem is, according to Tarrow, that as restrictive measures are slowly 
extended from one group to another and tend to become permanent, public opinion 
becomes accustomed to them and adapts. And where the limitation of civil rights is in-
volved, given that the danger is no longer represented by a state but comes from ene-
mies spread throughout the world and often hidden inside the country itself, a general-
ised sense of threat is easily generated, with the consequence that the application of 
emergency measures against 'internal enemies' becomes easier and does not meet any 
strong opposition. 
We must hope that populations do not suffer the fate of Chomsky's frog, which 
would have jumped out immediately if placed in a pot of boiling water, but, put first in 
pot of lukewarm water and then adapting all the time to an increase in the tempera-
ture of the water, ended up boiled.  
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